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FEDERAL JURISDICTION--CIvIL RIGHTS: A FEDERAL REMEDY AGAINST
PRIVATE CLASS DISCRIMINATION UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1970)-
Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
Plaintiffs, black citizens of Mississippi, sued in federal court under
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) 1 alleging that defendants, white citizens of Mis-
sissippi, had conspired to deprive them of the equal protection of the
laws and equal privileges and immunities under the law. Plaintiffs'
claim arose out of an incident during which defendants, under the
mistaken belief that a person in the company of plaintiffs was a civil
rights worker, stopped plaintiffs' car on a public highway, forced
them from the car and physically assaulted them. The district court
dismissed the suit on the ground that section 1985(3) reached only
conspiracies under color of state law, and the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. 2 On appeal the United States
Supreme Court reversed. Held: section 1985(3) does reach private,
racially motivated conspiracies in deprivation of the equal protection
of the laws and is a legitimate exercise of congressional power under
the thirteenth amendment and under Congress's power to protect the
right of interstate travel. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
Section 1985(3) was originally enacted as part of the sweeping civil
rights legislation of the Reconstruction period. 3 The history of section
1985(3), as with other surviving sections of the civil rights legislation
of that period, has been marked by judicially imposed limitations on
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1970) provides:
If two or more persons in any state or territory conspire or go in disguise on the
highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving,. either directly
or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or
of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; . . . [and] , . . if one or
more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the
object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or property, or
deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United
States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action for recovery of dam-
ages, occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the con-
spirators.
2. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 410 F.2d 817 (5th Cir. 1969), noted in 45 NOTRE DAME
LAWYER 372 (1970) and 23 VAND. L. REV. 158 (1969).
3. Section 1985(3) was first enacted as part of the Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 2,
17 Stat. 13, which was one of seven statutes enacted from 1866 to 1875 to implement the
provisions of the then recently enacted thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth amendments.
For a brief discussion of the purpose and coverage of those enactments see R. CARR,
FEDERAL PROTECTION OF CIVIL RIGHTS: QUEST FOR A SWORD 36-40 (1947).
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its application. 4 The Court's action in Griffin, in removing the color
of state law requirement from section 1985(3), redefining its scope,
and identifying alternative sources of congressional power to reach
private conspiracies, represents a significant step in the recent trend
toward revitalization of that legislation.5
An early indication of the difficulties to be encountered in inter-
preting the broad language of section 1985(3) was United States v.
Harris.6 There the Court interpreted the exact criminal counterpart of
section 1985(3) 7 to include private conspiracies in deprivation of
fourteenth amendment rights. The Court then found that Congress
had no authority under the fourteenth amendment to legislate against
private conspiracies and declared the statute unconstitutional. 8 Prob-
ably as a result of the doubts raised as to its constitutionality by the
Harris decision, section 1985(3) lay dormant for many years.9
In Collins v. Hardyinan'° the Court first considered the question of
whether section 1985(3) included private conspiracies in deprivation
of federal rights." The Collins Court emphasized that the language of
section 1985(3) referred only to conspiracies "for the purpose of de-
priving any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the
laws, or of the equal privileges and immunities under the law." 12
Applying the theory developed in the Civil Rights Cases,'3 the Court
reasoned that one's rights might be violated by a private conspiracy,
but a violation of rights could not constitute a deprivation of the equal
protection of the laws or equal privileges and immunities under the
4. For a discussion of the nature and effect of those limitations see Gressman. The
Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MICH. L. REV. 1323 (1952).
5. See notes 16-19 and accompanying text, infra.
6. 106 U.S. 629 (1882).
7. Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13. This was repealed in 1909.
8. The Harris Court also considered the constitutionality of the statute under the
thirteenth amendment and found that even if that amendment were held to be directed
against the action of private individuals the statute still would be unconstitutionally
overbroad. The Court stated that a law punishing white citizens for conspiring to de-
prive other white citizens of their rights "clearly cannot be authorized by the amendment
which simply prohibits slavery and involuntary servitude." Harris, 106 U.S. at 641.
9. It has been noted that from the date of its enactment until 1920 there were no
reported cases involving section 1985(3). Comment, The Civil Rights Act: Emergence
of an Adequate Federal Civil Remedy?, 26 IND. L. J. 361, 363 (1951).
10. 341 U.S. 651 (1951).
11. The circuit court, reversing a lower court decision, had held that section 1985(3)
did include private conspiracies in deprivation of rights of national citizenship. Har-
dyman v. Collins, 183 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1950).
12. Collins, 341 U.S. at 660.
13. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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law unless there also existed "some manipulation of the law or its
agencies to give sanction or sanctuary for doing so. ' 14 The Collins
Court then held that section 1985(3) did not apply to private con-
spiracies. 15
Recent cases arising under other civil rights statutes raised doubts
as to the continued validity of the Collins "color of state law" con-
struction of section 1985(3), but none dictated its removal. In Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer Co. 16 the Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 198217 bars all
racial discrimination, private as well as public, in the sale or rental of
property.' 8 Subsequent lower court decisions recognized "by analogy
to the Jones case that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 . . . is intended to prohibit
private racial discrimination"' 9 in contracts of employment.
14. Collins, 341 U.S. at 661. This theory was developed in the Civil Rights Cases for
the purpose of defining the scope of congressional power under the fourteenth amend-
ment. In Collins, however, the Court was not speaking in terms of congressional power;
rather, it was simply interpreting the language of section 1985(3) in a manner consistent
with the earlier interpretation of the similar language of the fourteenth amendment.
The "color of state law" requirement imposed in Collins has, with few exceptions,
been followed by the lower federal courts. See, e.g., Ehrlich v. Van Epps, 428 F.2d 363
(7th Cir. 1970); Wallach v. Cannon, 357 F.2d 557 (8th Cir. 1966); Hoffman v. Halden,
268 F.2d 280 (9th Cir. 1959). Additional cases are cited in Kock v. Zuieback, 194 F.
Supp. 651, 657-58 (S.D. Cal. 1961). But see Norton v. McShane, 332 F.2d 855, 863 n.13
(5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 981 (1965) (expressing uncertainty as to whether
section 1985(3) applied only where some of the persons so conspiring acted under color
of state law, but finding it unnecessary to pass on the question); Miles v. Armstrong, 207
F.2d 284 (7th Cir. 1953) (finding action under color of state law not required because
section 1985(3) applied only to deprivation of rights under federal statutes, not to state
rights); Central Presbyterian Church v. Black Liberation Front, 303 F. Supp. 894 (D.
Mo. 1969), and Gannon v. Action, 303 F. Supp. 1240 (D. Mo. 1969) (finding that the
clear and unambiguous terms of section 1985(3) do not contain any requirement of ac-
tion under color of state law).
15. The Collins Court did consider the possibility that a "conspiracy by private
individuals could be of such magnitude and effect as to work a deprivation of equal
protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws." 341
U.S. at 662. It then cited the post-Civil War Ku Klux Klan as a possible example of
such a conspiracy.
16. 392 U.S. 409 (1968). For a discussion of Jones see Comment, The Civil Rights
Act of 1866, Its Hour Come Round at Last: Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 55 VA. L.
REV. 272 (1969).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970) provides that:
All citizens of the United States shall have the same rights, in every State and Terri-
tory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold,
and convey real and personal property.
18. It had previously been held that section 1982 did not apply to instances of pri-
vate discrimination. Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 31 (1948).
19. Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 427 F.2d 476, 482 (7th Cir. 1970). Accord,
Dobbins v. Local 212, IBEW, 292 F. Supp. 413 (S.D. Ohio 1968). For a discussion of
the implications of Jones with regard to the possible utilization of section 1981 against
racial discrimination in employment see Peck, Remedies for Racial Discrimination in
Employment: A Comparative Evaluation of Forums, 46 WASH. L. REV. 455, 475-78
(1971).
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A similar application of the Jones rationale to section 1985(3) was
not possible. 20 The Jones decision emphasized the legislative history
of section 1982 as a part of section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
noting that it was enacted subsequent to the adoption of the thirteenth
amendment and prior to the adoption of the fourteenth, thereby indi-
cating a congressional intent to implement thirteenth amendment
rights without the state action limitation of the fourteenth amendment. 2'
Since section 1985(3) was first enacted as a part of the Civil Rights
Act of 1871 and was generally viewed as an implementation of rights
under the fourteenth amendment, that same argument would not
apply.22 Also, the color of state law requirement under section 1985(3)
was based on an interpretation of the language of the statute rather
than on any determination as to the limits of congressional power, 23
so any change in that requirement had to await the Court's reinterpre-
tation of the language. However, Jones did indicate a changed attitude
of the Court concerning the degree of liberality with which civil rights
statutes should be interpreted, 24 making a reinterpretation of the lan-
guage of section 1985(3) likely. 25
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970) provides:
All persons . . . shall have the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts, to
sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and pro-
ceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens,
and shall be subject to like punishments, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exac-
tions of every kind, and to no other.
20. See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 410 F.2d 817 (5th Cir. 1969).
21. Jones, 392 U.S. at 430-33.
22. The fourteenth amendment was adopted in 1868. Much of the language of sec-
tion 1985(3) was in fact derived from the Act of July 31, 1861, ch. 33, 12 Stat. 284.
However, that statute applied only to conspiracies against the United States Govern-
ment or its agents, and it was not until 1871 that the statute was enacted in its present
form.
23. See notes 10-15 and accompanying text, supra. In dictum contained in two sep-
arate opinions in United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966). six Justices agreed that
section five of the fourteenth amendment did authorize Congress to enact legislation
punishing private interference with fourteenth amendment rights; however, the Court
still has not squarely met and decided that issue. Since the Collins interpretation of sec-
tion 1985(3) was influenced by the Court's concern with the scope of congressional
power under the fourteenth amendment, actual removal of the state action requirement
from the fourteenth amendment would have left the Collins interpretation of section
1985 (3) with little validity.
24. "'We think that history leaves no doubt that, if we are to give [the law] the
scope that its origins dictate, we must accord it a sweep as broad as its language.'"
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 437 (1968). quoting United States v. Price.
383 U.S. 787, 801 (1966).
25. See Central Presbyterian Church v. Black Liberation Front, 303 F. Supp.
894 (D. Mo. 1969), and Gannon v. Action, 303 F. Supp. 1240 (D. Mo. 1969). Both
cases held, on the authority of the Jones decision, that the plain and unambiguous terms
of section 1985(3) did not contain any requirement of action under color ofstate law.
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The Griffin Court abandoned the Collins v. Hardyman principle
that there can be no deprivation of equal protection of the laws
without some degree of state involvement and concluded that "there is
nothing inherent in the phrase that requires the action working the
deprivation to come from the state. '26 While the Collins decision was
influenced by a desire to avoid the constitutional issues that might
have been raised by holding section 1985(3) to include private con-
spiracies, the Griffin Court noted that many of those problems
"simply do not exist."27 Also, the Court observed that each of the three
possible forms for a state action limitation on section 1985(3) was
explicitly dealt with in other parts of the same statute, and that such a
limitation on section 1985(3) would, therefore, render it superfluous. 28
The Court further noted that during the debates surrounding adop-
tion of the amendment which added the present civil remedy to the
statute, the sponsors were concerned solely with the motivation 29 that
would be required to bring the conspiracy within the statute. There
26. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 97. This interpretation of the language conforms to that
announced in United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 639 (1882). It was that interpreta-
tion that caused the criminal counterpart of section 1985(3) to be declared unconstitu-
tionally overbroad. See notes 6-9 and acompanying text, supra.
27. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 96. The constitutional issues that the Collins Court felt
might be raised by a decision including private conspiracies within the scope of section
1985(3) involved:
... Congressional power under and apart from the Fourteenth Amendment, the
reserved power of the States, the content of rights derived from national as
distinguished from state citizenship, and the question of separability of the Act
in its application to those two classes of rights.
Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. at 659.
One of the problems perceived in Collins which no longer exists is the question of
separability of the act with regard to its application to rights of national citizenship as
distinguished from state citizenship. It is now the rule that a court need not find a statute
to be constitutional in all of its possible applications in order to find a particular appli-
cation constitutional, and if it is found that a particular application would be unconsti-
tutional, the court may give it a limited construction. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S.
88, 104 (1971). See United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 20-24 (1960). By finding con-
stitutional authorization for this particular application. of the statute under both the thir-
teenth amendment and the power of Congress to protect the right of interstate travel, the
Griffin Court avoided consideration of the other difficult constitutional issues men-
tioned in Collins, specifically, the scope of congressional power under the fourteenth
amendment.
28. The three possible forms of a state action limitation on section 1985(3) listed by
the court are: (1) that there must be action under color of state law, (2) that there must
be interference with or influence upon state authorities, and (3) that there must be a pri-
vate conspiracy so massive and effective that it supplants state authorities. Griffin, 403
U.S. at 98.
29. See notes 35-37 and accompanying text, infra.
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was no suggestion that liability would not be imposed for purely pri-
vate conspiracies. 30
The expansion of the scope of section 1985(3) resulting from re-
moval of the color of law requirement has been limited to some extent
by the Court's clarification of the intent requirement under the statute.
Prior to Griffin it was generally held that a cause of action under sec-
tion 1985(3) required a showing of "intentional or purposeful" dis-
crimination; 31 however, that requirement was not consistently applied.
Many courts found the requirement to be met by complaints alleging
that plaintiff, simply as an individual, was singled out for discrimina-
tory treatment; 32 others held that in order to meet the requirement of
intentional or purposeful discrimination the plaintiff must show that he
was subjected to a greater risk of injury than were other residents of the
state.33 Although the latter requirement was difficult to meet without a
showing of class discrimination, 34 no court specifically limited applica-
30. For an analysis reaching a contrary conclusion, see Avins, The Kut Klux Klan
Act of 1871: Some Reflected Light on State Action and the Fourteenth Amendment, I I
ST. Louis L.J. 331 (1967). Avins analyzes the congressional debates surrounding pas-
sage of the 1871 act and concludes that the act was intended as an exercise of congres-
sional power under the fourteenth amendment, with the clear intention that it be re-
stricted in application to instances of state action. He views the broad language of sec-
tions 5519 and 1985(3) merely as examples of bad draftsmanship. He points out that the
reasoning of the Court in Harris was identical to the reasoning of those supporting the
1871 act, and he concludes that section 5519 was declared unconstitutionally overbroad
because its language did not reflect the intent of its sponsors. Under this analysis the
Collins interpretation of 1985(3), although contrary to the Harris interpretation of
identical language, could be considered an accurate reflection of the intent of the 42nd
Congress.
31. This element of a cause of action under section 1985(3) generally has been at-
tributed to a 1944 case which involved the predecessor statutes to section 1985(3) and
1983. Snowdon v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 (1944). Snowden held that in order for a denial of
a right conferred by a state law to constitute a denial of equal protection of the laws
there must be present in that denial an element of intentional or purposeful discrimina-
tion. See also Hoffman v. Halden, 268 F.2d 280 (9th Cir. 1959).
32. See, e.g., Jenks v. Henys, 378 F.2d 334 (9th Cir. 1967); Glicker v. Michigan
Liquor Control Comm'n, 160 F.2d 96 (6th Cir. 1947); Burt v. City of New York. 156
F.2d 791 (2d Cir. 1946); Maniaci v. Warren, 314 F. Supp. 853 (W.D. Wis. 1970): Ste-
venson v. Sanders, 311 F. Supp. 683 (W.D. Ky. 1970); Klor v. Hannon, 278 F. Supp.
359 (C.D. Cal. 1967); Rhodes v. Houston, 202 F. Supp. 624 (D. Neb.), affd 309 F.2d
959 (8th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 909 (1963). At times this appeared to
have developed into a rather technical requirement. Compare Lee v. Hodges. 321
F.2d 480 (4th Cir. 1963) (an allegation of purposeful discrimination was held
sufficient), with Birnbaum v. Trussell, 371 F. 2d 672 (2d Cir. 1966) (an allegation
of malicious discrimination was held insufficient).
33. See, e.g., Stift v. Lynch, 267 F.2d 237 (7th Cir. 1959); Jennings v. Nester, 217
F.2d 153 (7th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 958 (1955); Campo v. Niemeyer, 182
F.2d 115 (7th Cir. 1950); Morgan v. Null, 120 F. Supp. 803 (S.D. N.Y. 1954).
34. See, e.g., Wyland v. Mason's Stores, 279 F. Supp. 283, 289 (W.D. Pa. 1968).
358
Vol. 47: 353, 1972
Federal Jurisdiction
tion of section 1985(3) to instances where class discrimination was
present.
In Griffin the Court stated that section 1985(3) is not intended as a
remedy for the discriminatory deprivation of rights unless there is "the
kind of invidiously discriminatory motivation stressed by the sponsors
of the limiting amendment. '35 The Court then concluded that the lan-
guage of the sponsors36 and of the statute "requiring an intent to de-
prive of equal protection, or equal privileges and immunities, means
that there must be some racial or perhaps otherwise class-based, invid-
iously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' action. 37
Those cases holding a cause of action to have been stated under sec-
tion 1985(3) by a complaint alleging purposeful discrimination to-
ward an individual with no allegation of racial or otherwise
class-based motivation will not be followed.38
The Griffin Court restricted its decision to the facts of the case and
did not decide whether future applications of section 1985(3) will be
limited to those instances where racial bias is the motivating factor
behind the conspiracy. However, it did refer to congressional testi-
mony preceding passage of the 1871 limiting amendment which
clearly indicates that such a limitation was not intended. 39 Since the
Therein the court noted that plaintiff had made no allegation of class discrimination and
concluded that no cause of action under section 1985(3) was stated.
35. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102.
36. Id. at 101.
37. Id. at 102. This is precisely the language relied upon by the Collins Court in
imposing the color of law requirement. See notes 11-13 and accompanying text, supra.
Although perhaps unnecessary, the imposition of this limitation does not appear to be
consistent with the Griffin Court's stated desire to give the statute a scope as broad as its
language. 403 U.S. at 97.
38. The Court made it clear, however, that liability under section 1985(3) is not
dependent upon a showing of a specific intent to cause a particular injury or to deprive
plaintiff of a federal right. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102 n.10. Rather, it suggested that the
standard for liability under section 1985(3) will be the tort standard as announced in
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961), for application under section 1983, "that
makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of his action." Therefore, a cause
of action for a negligently caused injury could lie under section 1985(3) if it could be
shown that the negligent act was done in furtherance of a conspiracy motivated by class
discrimination.
For a discussion of the application of the negligence standard to a case of police
abuse arising under section 1983 see 23 VAND. L. REV. 1341 (1971).
39. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102 n.9. The Court referred to congressional testimony
during the debates preceding passage of the 1871 limiting amendment as an indication
of the type of invidiously discriminatory motivation intended to be reached by the
statute. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 567 (1871) (remarks of Senator Edmunds):
We do not undertake in this bill to interfere with what might be called a private
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Court stated that its intent was to give effect to that congressional
purpose, it may reasonably be concluded that class discrimination
based on factors other than race will be within the statute.
A question then arises as to whether the language of section
1985(3) will be construed in such a manner as to limit the types of
non-racial class discrimination to which the statute may be applied.
The Griffin decision suggests no such limitation. The Court's limita-
tion on the application of the statute to the kind of invidiously dis-
criminatory animus intended by the sponsors of the limiting amend-
ment was in reference to the class limitation itself, not to the types of
classes to be included. Also, the Court's reference to the testimony of
Senator Edmunds was to show that application of the statute was not
intended to be limited to racial discrimination. It should not be read
as suggesting that application of the statute is to be limited to those
particular types of classes to which the senator referred. It is possible,
of course, that in future cases the Court could formulate limitations
on the types of class discrimination to which the statute will be
applied. For example, the testimony of Senator Edmunds could
be cited for the purpose of limiting application of the statute to
the types of classes to which he referred: those based on such
factors as religion, political affiliation, or place of origin. It might
be argued that these are some of the broad historical categories
of discrimination which are national in scope and therefore of special
significance for federal protection. However, such a limitation would
be artificial at best and the problems involved in defining the types of
classes included under such criteria would be nearly insurmountable.
Furthermore, it cannot be said that because a class is not national in
scope or historical in origin it is any less in need of federal protection
against discrimination. Because of the practical problems and the
policy considerations which would be involved in construing the lan-
guage of section 1985(3) as applying only to discrimination against
particular classes, it is unlikely that such a limitation will be imposed.
Assuming that the language of section 1985(3) will be found to ex-
tend to all conspiracies motivated by racial or class-based invidious
conspiracy growing out of a neighborhood feud of one man or set of men against
another to prevent one getting an indictment in the State courts against men for
burning down his barn; but, if in a case like this, it should appear that this con-
spiracy was formed against this man because he was a Democrat . . . or because
he was a Catholic, or because he was a Methodist, or because he was a
Vermonter. . . . then this section could reach it.
360
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discrimination involving deprivation of federal rights, and resulting in
injury, there remains one significant limitation on the application of
the statute: identification of a constitutional source of congressional
power to reach the conspiracy alleged. The Griffin Court held that the
creation of "a statutory cause of action for Negro citizens who have
been victims of conspiratorial, racially discriminatory private action
aimed at depriving them of the basic rights that the law secures to all
free men" 40 is within the power of Congress to legislate against badges
of slavery under section 2 of the thirteenth amendment. Because the
thirteenth amendment contains no state action requirement, congres-
sional power under section 2 is limited only by a determination of
what constitutes badges and incidents of slavery, and the scope of that
power is significant for identifying possible future applications of sec-
tion 1985(3).
In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.41 the Court declared that the
power of Congress to pass all laws necessary to abolish badges and
incidents of slavery in the United States includes the power to elimi-
nate all racial barriers to the aquisition of real and personal property. 42
Further, Congress, not the Court, "has the power under the Thir-
teenth Amendment rationally to determine what are the badges and
incidents of slavery, and the authority to translate that determination
into effective legislation. '43 So long as that determination is a rational
one, the Court will not declare it beyond the power of Congress.4 4
The Jones decision left the issue of the limits of congressional power
under the thirteenth amendment very much open to conjecture, and
the principal case does little to clarify the matter.
40. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 105.
41. 392U.S. 409 (1968).
42. The Jones decision overruled several previous decisions, including Hodges v.
United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906). In Hodges the Court recognized that "one of the disa-
bilities of slavery .. . was a lack of power to make or perform contracts .. ." Id. at
17. Yet it held that interference, on the basis of race, with the right of a black citizen in
the performance of his contract of employment did not constitute a badge of slavery.
This conclusion resulted from the Court's view that only conduct which actually enslaves
someone can be subjected to punishment under legislation enacted to enforce the
thirteenth amendment. Id. at 16.
For a discussion of the development of congressional power under the thirteenth
amendment see Comment, Constitutional Law: Badges and Indices of Slavery Prohib-
ited under the 1866 Civil Rights Act, 17 LOYOLA L. REV. 79 (1970).
43. Jones, 392 U.S. at 440.
44. Subsequent lower court decisions have held, on the authority of Jones, that the
thirteenth amendment also authorizes Congress to legislate against racial discrimination
involving contracts of employment. See, e.g., Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 427
F.2d 476, 482 (7th Cir. 1970); Dobbins v. Local 212, IBEW, 292 F. Supp. 413 (S.D.
Ohio 1968).
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In Griffin the Court did not specifically identify any particular
rights the deprivation of which would constitute badges of slavery;
rather, it referred in general terms to "the basic rights the law secures
to all free men." 45 The complaint in Griffin alleged that the purpose
of the conspiracy was to prevent plaintiffs and other blacks from
seeking the equal protection of the laws and from enjoying equal
rights, privileges and immunities of citizens under the laws, "including
a long list of enumerated rights such as free speech, assembly, associa-
tion, and movement."46 Since any of those rights might well be de-
scribed as among "the basic rights the law secures to all free men," it
appears that a conspiracy in deprivation of any federally protected
right will be found to be within section 1985(3) as a valid exercise of
congressional power under the thirteenth amendment, at least where
the conspiracy is motivated by discrimination against blacks.
There has been no express Supreme Court ruling on whether con-
gressional power to legislate against badges of slavery extends to dis-
crimination against racial groups other than blacks. In Jones the
Court referred to the power of Congress "to eliminate all racial bar-
riers" to the acquisition of property, with no indication that that power
was limited to the elimination of such barriers for blacks. It could be
argued, therefore, that discrimination against any racial group re-
sulting in the deprivation of rights constitutes a badge of slavery.47
However, the Griffin decision does nothing to further this view of
congressional power; it contains no language referring to congres-
sional power to eliminate "all racial discrimination," as did Jones. In
fact, the Griffin Court stated that congressional power to identify and
legislate against badges and incidents of slavery is to give effect to our
commitment "as a nation to the proposition that the former slaves and
their descendents should be forever free."' 48 It is not clear whether the
Court intended this as a statement of the sole purpose of congressional
45. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 105.
46. Id. at 103.
47. Adoption of this view could result in significant expansion of congressional
power under the thirteenth amendment because of the rather fine distinctions between
racial discrimination and discrimination on the basis of religion or economic status.
For example, the power of Congress to legislate against the badges of slavery could con-
ceivably develop into a general power to guarantee to every person that he will not be
deprived of "the basic rights the law secures to all free men" as a result of race or class
discrimination. This would result in a parallel expansion of the types of conspiracies
actionable under section 1985(3) with thirteenth amendment authorization.
48. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 105.
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power under the thirteenth amendment, but if it was, then the only
causes of action under section 1985(3) authorized by that amendment
will be those resulting from conspiracies motivated by discrimination
against blacks. 49
Assuming that congressional power under the thirteenth amend-
ment is so limited, then for those conspiracies which are found to have
the requisite class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus, but which
are not based on discrimination against blacks, it becomes necessary
to find other sources of constitutional authority. In Griffin the Court
specified as an independent source of congressional power the right of
interstate travel, which, "like other rights of national citizenship, is
within the power of Congress to protect by appropriate legislation"50
and "is assertable against private as well as public interference. 51 Al-
though not specifically stated by the Court, it logically follows that if
the conspiracy has as its purpose or effect the infringment of any of
the rights of national citizenship which have been held to be assertable
against private individuals,5 2 not just the right of interstate travel, the
injured party will be allowed to seek relief in federal court under sec-
tion 1985(3) without regard to the existence of state action.
By relying alternatively on congressional power under the thir-
teenth amendment to legislate against the badges and incidents of
slavery, and on its power to legislate in protection of the right of inter-
state travel, the Court avoided considering whether application of sec-
tion 1985(3) against private conspiracies in deprivation of the equal
protection of the laws constitutes a valid exercise of congressional
49. However, even that conclusion would not necessarily mean that the plaintiff
must be black. For example, discrimination against blacks in the purchase or sale of
property was held in Jones to constitute a badge of slavery against which Congress had
the power to legislate. Surely a conspiracy aimed at denying blacks the right to purchase
property in a neighborhood would not be beyond congressional power under the thir-
teenth amendment simply because the person injured was white.
50. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 106.
51. Id. at 105. The principle that the right to interstate travel is assertable against
private as well as public interference was first announced in United States v. Guest, 383
U.S. 745, 759 (1966). Prior cases recognizing congressional power to protect the right of
interstate travel had involved only governmental interference. Id. at 759 n. 17.
52. Among the rights of national citizenship which have been held to be assertable
against private interference are the right to be free of private interference in federal elec-
tions, Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884); the right to be free from attack while
in the custody of a U.S. marshal, Logan v. United States 144 U.S. 263 (1892); the
right to inform federal officials of violations of federal law, In re Quarles, 158 U.S.
532 (1895), United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875); and the right to exer-
cise other specific rights granted by federal statute, United States v. Waddell, 112 U.S.
76(1884).
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power under the fourteenth amendment.53 Recent cases arising under
the fourteenth amendment have significantly relaxed the "state action"
limit on congressional power under that amendment. Indeed, some
commentators have concluded that the requirement has in fact been
removed, at least for some categories of cases. 54 Actual removal of the
state action requirement would obviate reliance on other sources of
constitutional authorization for particular applications of section
1985(3). However, in the absence of any affirmative declaration in
that regard, it must be assumed that conspiracies meeting the require-
ment of a class-based invidiously discriminatory animus, but involving
neither discrimination against blacks nor infringment of rights of na-
tional citizenship, will not be subject to attack under section 1985(3)
unless the state action requirement of the fourteenth amendment is
met.
An inevitable criticism of the Griffin decision will be that it consti-
tutes yet another extension of federal jurisdiction into areas previously
reserved to the states. It should be noted, however, that removal of the
color of state law requirement from section 1985(3) is of present sig-
nificance only for those categories of cases outside the scope of the
fourteenth amendment. For cases involving action under color of law,
thereby meeting the fourteenth amendment state action requirement,
section 1983 clearly provides the most likely means of recovery. 55 It
should also be recognized that although the Court removed the color
of state law requirement, it imposed the more appropriate requirement
of discrimination based on race or other class. While it is true that vir-
tually every plaintiff can allege that his injury resulted from action
taken against him as a member of a class rather than as an individual,
53. For a discussion of the extent of congressional power under the fourteenth
amendment see Silard, A Constitutional Forecast: Demise of the State Action Limit on
the Equal Protection Guarantee, 66 CoiuMi. L. REv. 855 (1966). For a discussion of the
implications of United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966) in this regard see Comment.
Fourteenth Amendment Congressional Power to Legislate Against Private Discrimina-
tion: The Guest Case, 52 CORNELL L. REv. 586 (1967).
54. See, e.g., Morris & Powe, Constitutional and StattttorY Rights to Open Housing,
44 WASH. L. REv. I, 57-60(1968).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
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the possibility of plaintiffs gaining access to federal courts on mere
colorable allegations presents no significant difficulty. In cases arising
under section 1985(3), as in other cases where federal jurisdiction ex-
ists under a particular statute, the plaintiff must plead facts showing
the basis for that jurisdiction, and it cannot be shown by mere conclu-
sory allegations. 56
Nevertheless, since neither diversity of citizenship nor jurisdictional
amount need be alleged in civil rights actions brought under 28
U.S.C. § 1343, 57 the removal of the color of law requirement from
section 1985(3) does create a significant addition to the federal reme-
dies available for combatting violations of civil rights. While the
Court's limitation of the scope of the statute to instances of class
discrimination will preclude its application to some types of cases
previously held to be covered, 58 it is unlikely that such limitation
will result in serious denials of remedy. Injuries suffered as a
result of private injustice normally can find relief at the state level.
It is when the injustice results from class discrimination or from
official action that the local remedy tends to be inadequate. Most
deprivations of rights resulting from action under color of state
law, whether or not motivated by class discrimination, can find relief
in federal court under section 1983. Similar relief is now available
under section 1985(3) for injuries resulting from class discrimination
not involving action under color of the state law. However, relief
under section 1985(3) is limited by the scope of congressional power
under the Constifution. Removal of the state action limitation on con-
gressional power under the fourteenth amendment would allow appli-
cation of section 1985(3) to all categories of class-based discrimina-
tion. A similar result could be achieved by recognizing that congres-
sional power to legislate against badges of slavery under the thirteenth
amendment extends to the protection of groups other than blacks.
56. 4 F. POORE & E. KOEBER, CYLOPEDIA OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE, 14.145, at 162
(3d rev. ed. 1970).
57. 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970) provides in relevant part:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized
by law to be commenced by any person:
(1) To recover damages for injury to his person or property, or because of the
deprivation of any right of [sic] privilege of a citizen of the United States, by any
act done in furtherance of any conspiracy mentioned in section 1985 of Title 42;
58. See note 31, supra.
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Whatever course is taken regarding congressional power under the
thirteenth and fourteenth amendments, development of section
1985(3) into a fully effective remedy for injuries resulting from all
types of class-based discrimination is dependent upon expansion of
the recognized scope of that power.
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